Christ the Saviour - Chapter 16

Christ the Saviour - Chapter 16

CH 4: QUESTION 2

Fourth Article: Whether After The Incarnation The Person Or Hypostasis Is Composite

State of the question. Some deny that the person of Christ is composite, such as St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Scotus; and this for reasons posited by St. Thomas in his objections at the beginning of this article. He points out: (1) that the person of Christ is the very person of the Word, who is in Himself most simple, and in no way composite. (2) Moreover, the divine nature cannot be a part in Christ, because the part is always less perfect than the whole. (3) It cannot be said that Christ is composed of two natures, because thus there would be a composite nature, just as the human nature is composed of soul and body, and then the Deity would be to the composite as form, and therefore as part. This would be Monophysitism.

Reply. The person of Christ is one, but is composed of two natures.

First proof. It rests on the authority of St. Damascene, who is quoted in the counterargument of this article. Moreover, the Second Council of Constantinople corroborates the conclusion stated above, saying: “The Holy Church of God… confesses that the union of the Word of God with the flesh was by way of composition, which means that it was subsistential.”[595]

Second proof. The argument is from reason, and there are two parts to it.

a) The person of Christ in itself is an absolutely simple uncreated being, even as the nature of the Word is, and therefore in itself is in no way composite. Thus Christ is one subsisting being.

b) Nevertheless, this person of Christ subsists in two natures, and thus He can and must be said to be a composite of two natures.

First objection. The reply is evident from the argumentative part of the article.

Reply to second objection. The divine nature, however, is not to be considered as a part of this composite. For “this composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.” Hence Christ is not a composite of parts, but of extremes that are united. St. Thomas explains this point more fully elsewhere,[596] remarking that composition may be viewed in two ways.

1. It may be considered as the union of parts which causes and results in the totality of the being, and this union implies imperfection, inasmuch as the part is an incomplete being, not so perfect as the whole, and inasmuch as the being of the whole is dependent on its parts and thus is caused.

2. Composition may be viewed as the union of extremes in some third entity that communicates being to the extremes. The extreme, however, prescinds from the notion whether it be a complete or incomplete being. Thus, for example, seeing terminates in the thing seen without resulting in any imperfection on the part of the object seen, on which the seeing depends, but which does not depend on the seeing. Thus the intellect of the blessed is united to God who is clearly seen, without involving any imperfection on the part of God. There is something similar to this in the hypostatic union, but in the order of being and not merely of operation, since the human nature is terminated by the absolutely simple person of the divine Word, without involving any imperfection on the part of the divine person. The person of the Word is related to the human nature not as informing act, but as terminating act.

First corollary. Christ is also a composite of the person of the Word and the human nature, because He consists of these really distinct and united. Yet it cannot be said that Christ is a creature, because created being applies to the person, who is what is. The person of Christ, however, is uncreated, but in Him the human nature is something created.

Second corollary. Although Christ is thus composite, He is not more perfect than the Word not made flesh in this composition, because the Word is the infinite extreme eminently containing the perfection of the human nature.

In contrast to this, God is not said to be a composite of persons and nature, because the divine persons, although united in the same nature, are not united among one another, but are rather in opposition, not being united with the nature, because They are simply identical with the nature. Thus They are not really distinct from the nature, but They are really distinct from one another by a relation of opposition.

Fifth Article: Whether In Christ There Is Any Union Of Soul And Body

State of the question. If so, then it seems that there would be in Christ a human person, for the human person is the result of the union of the soul with the body.

Reply. The answer is in the affirmative and it is of faith.[597] But the human nature thus being a composite has not its own personality.

Sixth Article: Whether The Human Nature Was United To The Word Of God Accidentally

This article is both a recapitulation of the preceding articles and the completion of their definition of the hypostatic union.

State of the question. It seems that this union is accidental, for whatever accrues to a being after it is complete as an entity, accrues to it accidentally. Whatever does not pertain to the essence of anything, is its accident. But the human nature does not pertain to the divine nature of the Son of God. Therefore the union of the human nature with the divine nature is accidental.

Reply. It is given about the end of the argumentative part of the article. St. Thomas says: “The Catholic faith, holding an intermediate position between Monophysitism and Nestorianism, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis.”[598]

1. Indirect proof. It is drawn from the counterargument, and is expressed by the following argument. Whatever is predicated accidentally, is not predicated substantially, but quantitatively or qualitatively. But the humanity of Christ is not predicated quantitatively or qualitatively. Therefore it is not predicated accidentally.

2. Direct proof. It is founded on the arguments defining the faith on this point, which declare that the union is not natural, which is against Eutyches, nor accidental, which is against Nestorius, but is subsistential. The two opinions quoted by the Master of the Sentences in this article may be included in the error of Nestorius. The argument may be reduced to the following syllogism.

The union of substantial things that form the composite of one person is not accidental. But such is the union of the Word incarnate. Therefore the union is in no way accidental, but substantial, which means that it is subsistential.

This implies more than the expression “in the person,” for even accidents are in the person to whom they are attributed.[599] To understand this article it must be noted that there are four modes of per se predication, and that personal union means more than union in the person, as Cajetan observes.[600]

There are four modes of per se and not per accidens predication, as Aristotle explains.[601] St. Thomas says in his commentary on Aristotle: In the first mode of per se predication, definition is predicated of the subject, for instance, man is per se or essentially a rational animal.

In the second mode of per se predication a property is predicated of the subject, for instance, man is risible, or has the power of laughing, which manifests itself on his countenance as an indication of intelligence, and this power does not belong either to the angel or to the irrational animal.

The third mode of per se predication is more the mode that pertains to existence, and not to predication, since it signifies something that exists in itself and not in another as in a subject. Thus first substance, for example, Peter, is per se or in himself existing, in opposition to accident, and to second substance, for example to humanity, which is predicated of Peter and is in him.

The fourth mode of per se predication is according to the notion of causality, when the proper effect is attributed to its proper cause. Thus the doctor restores to health, that is, he does this inasmuch as he is a doctor; strangling kills, light illumines. Contrary to this, it is accidental that the doctor sings.

It is evident that the humanity is united with the Word neither in the first mode, nor in the second mode, nor in the fourth mode, but in the third mode, inasmuch as it exists in the Word not per accidens, but per se,[602] and as Cajetan says,[603] it is united with the Word not only as in the person or in the hypostasis, as accidents are so united with substance, but it is united with the Word hypostatically, which means substantially, according to the third mode of predication.

Solution of difficulties. Durandus holds that this union is not predicamentally or physically accidental, because humanity belongs to the predicamental substance, and not to any of the others. But the union is predicably or logically accidental, because the predicable accident is defined as that which can be either present or absent from its subject of predication, without the corruption of this latter. But the humanity can be either present or absent from the Word, which remains unchanged.

The principal objections in scholastic form are the following.

First objection. What accrues to anything after the completion of its being, accrues to it accidentally. But the human nature accrues to the Word after the completion of the former as a being. Therefore the human nature is united with the Word accidentally.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if it is not drawn into the same personal being, I concede the major; otherwise I deny it. I contradistinguish the minor: that the human nature is drawn into the personal being of the Word,[604] this I concede; that it is not, this I deny.

But I insist. Even though it is drawn into the same personal being, it is united accidentally. The accident that accrues to any subject is drawn into the same being of the subject. But the accident is united with this subject. Therefore the human nature is united with the Word accidentally.

Reply. I distinguish the major: that it is drawn into the same being of the suppositum, this I deny; improperly so, I concede; for it has its own being, but inheres in a subject. It belongs to the being of accident to inhere. I concede the minor. I distinguish the conclusion: if the human nature were an accident inhering in the Word, then I concede the conclusion; otherwise I deny it.

The human nature is truly united with the Word not only in the person as accidents are, but also substantially inasmuch as it is terminated by the personality of the Word, and has one personal being or one existence with it, just as body and soul are so united.

Again I insist. Nevertheless the union is accidental at least predicably, if not predicamentally as Durandus says.

What is not predicated of a subject per se is a predicable accident.

But the human nature is not predicated per se of the Word.

Therefore the human nature is united with the Word as a predicable accident.

Reply. I distinguish the major; what is in no way predicated per se, I concede; what is at least predicated per se in the third mode or per se as subsisting, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor, and I deny the consequent and consequence. The humanity of Christ does not indeed belong to the definition of the Word or of the Second Person of the Trinity, nor is it a property of the Word, but the Word subsists in the human nature, and the human nature in the Word.

Finally I insist. Nevertheless, what can be either absent or present, the subject remaining intact, is united with the subject accidentally. But the human nature can be absent from the Word, which remains intact. Therefore the human nature is united with the Word accidentally.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the subject remaining intact considered as a composite, this I concede; the subject considered as a mere subsisting form, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the human nature can be absent, the Word remaining intact considered in Himself, as the eternal person, I concede; considered as the Word incarnate, I deny.

Thus the body is not united accidentally with the soul, and yet the body can be separated from the soul, this latter continuing to exist, though the composite ceases as such. In other words, there can be no separation of the body from the soul unless there is a cessation of the composite, and so the union is per se and not per accidens. Similarly the humanity is united with the Word, although the union between the two is not essential.

Corollary. Hence the hypostatic union differs from an essential union that would result in one sole composite nature, such as the union between body and soul. It also differs from an accidental union. It is, however, an absolutely unique union of its kind, one that is subsistential or hypostatic, or a formally personal union, and not only a material union in the person, for even accidents, which accrue to man, are united to him materially in the person, but not formally as constituting the person.

Therefore Christ’s human nature in the Word is neither a predicamental accident, as, for example, the intellectual faculty is in the rational soul or in the angel, nor a predicable or contingent accident as, for example, a certain person may be sitting instead of standing.

Thus is determined the exact meaning of this conciliar expression, namely, “hypostatic union.” We are not concerned here with a theological conclusion deduced from the dogma, but with a metaphysical explanation of the dogma. The hypostatic union is not a new truth concerning the Incarnation, but it is a metaphysical explanation of this revealed truth.

Seventh Article: Whether The Union Of The Divine Nature And The Human Is Something Created

State of the question. It seems that the union is not anything created, and this for the following reasons.

1. Because this union is in God, for it is God united to the human nature, and there can be nothing created in God.

2. The terminus of the union is the uncreated person of the Word. Therefore the union itself is not anything created.

This question presents considerable difficulty, because there are three possible meanings to the word “union.” It may be understood: (1) as unitive action; (2) as rather the passive union of some things into one; (3) as a relation that follows from this union.

1. If we consider the union as meaning the act of uniting the human nature with the Word, then certainly the action is uncreated, and it is common to the whole Trinity, for the Father and the Holy Ghost united Christ’s human nature with the Word, although they did not assume it.[605] This action common to the whole Trinity, inasmuch as it is dependent on the omnipotence that is common to the three Persons, is formally immanent, but virtually transitive, and hence is certainly uncreated.

2. If we consider the union as implying a real relation of dependence on the part of Christ’s human nature on the Word, St. Thomas clearly shows it to be something created, and so it presents no difficulty.

3. But if we consider the union rather as denoting a passive combination of Christ’s humanity with the Word, then theologians dispute whether it is something real and created that is distinct from the human nature. Scotus, Suarez, Vasquez, and certain Thomists, such as the Salmanticenses and Godoy, as also Father de la Taille in recent times, affirm this view.[606] But Scotus would have it to be something relative that is an extrinsic adjunct, whereas others say it is a substantial mode and the foundation of the real relation of which St. Thomas speaks.

On the contrary, Cajetan and several other Thomists, such as Billuart and Father Billot, deny that the union is something created, remarking that there is no substantial mode in this case, one that is a quasi-intermediate connection formally uniting the human nature with the Word, so that it is impossible to detect any other formal union distinct from the extremes united, except the relation itself that follows from the passive change effected in the human nature by the action of the Word uniting to Himself. So says Billuart. Thus passive creation is merely a real relation of dependence, nothing else, and it has its foundation in the being of a creature, inasmuch as a creature is not its own existence. This seems to be the true solution of the difficulty.[607] Let us see what St. Thomas says.

In the counterargument he observes that this union began in time, therefore it is something created. In the body of the article, however, he determines what this something created formally is. St. Thomas speaks only of relation here. His argument is reduced to the following syllogism.

Every relation between God and the creature is real in the creature and logical in God. But the relation about which we speak is a certain relation of Christ’s humanity to the Word. Therefore this union is in Christ’s humanity as something real, and created, namely, a real relation of dependence on the Word assuming this nature, just as creation is a real relation of dependence of the creature on the Creator.[608]

But what is the foundation for this relation? St. Thomas says in the body of this article: “By the change effected in the creature such a relation is brought into being,” that is, this foundation is passion that corresponds to the unitive action. Whether this passion is really distinct from the human nature passively assumed, is a disputed point among the above-mentioned theologians.

Let us see whether the replies to the objections define more clearly the nature of this union.

Reply to first objection. It declares that this union is not anything real in God.

Reply to second objection. It states that this union is something real and created in the human nature. It is not apparent from this reply that the union is anything more than a real relation.

Did St. Thomas speak more explicitly on this point elsewhere? He certainly did; for in another of his commentaries he says: “We must know that in the union of the human nature with the divine there can be nothing intervening that is the formal cause of the union with which the human nature is joined before it is united with the person. For, just as there can be no intervening entity between matter and form that would be in the matter prior to the substantial form, otherwise accidental existence would be prior to substantial existence, which is impossible; so also between the nature and the suppositum there can be nothing intervening in the above said mode.”[609] Thus there is nothing intervening between the Word and the humanity. Hence union in the passive sense or created is nothing else but a real relation of the human nature that is dependent on the Word as a person, just as creation in the passive sense is nothing else but a real relation of dependence of the creature on the Creator.

Which is the more probable opinion? An intervening substantial mode between the Word and the human nature, as Cajetan, Billuart and others show, appears to be inadmissible.

Proof. The Word is united with the human nature by that whereby the Word terminates and maintains it. But the Word by Himself or solely by his personality, every formal connection excluded, terminates and sustains the human nature. Therefore the Word Himself or His personality is united with the human nature.

The union of the Word with the human nature means nothing else but the termination of this latter; thus analogically, in the order of operation, God clearly seen immediately terminates the beatific vision.

First confirmation. Created subsistence is by itself immediately united with created nature. Therefore a fortiori uncreated subsistence is so united, as it is most actual in the notion of terminating.

Second confirmation. Likewise existence, as the ultimate actuality, by itself immediately actuates the created suppositum; similarly personality by itself immediately is united with created nature, or terminates it; so also one and the same point immediately terminates two lines that meet in it, which is a very faint image of the union of the two natures in the Word.

Doubt. Was the human nature changed in being assumed by the Word?

Reply. In the strictest sense of the term, it was not, because it did not exist before it was assumed, inasmuch as it did not have its own personality, but was assumed by another personality. A nature must be first produced before it can be assumed.

Thus St. Thomas shows[610] that creation is not a change except as we conceive it, for he says: “Change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously.”[611] But this cannot be either in creation, or even in the assumption of Christ’s humanity, which did not exist before its assumption. And St. Thomas says: “When motion is removed from action and passion, only relation remains.”[612] Hence creation in the passive sense is nothing but a real relation of dependence that has its foundation in created substantial being. Similarly, in the hypostatic union, the soul of Christ is created as dependent on the Word as a person. If other authors wish to affirm that it is something else, namely, a special substantial mode, let them prove its existence. St. Thomas never spoke about this special mode.

What is therefore the foundation of the relation in the hypostatic union? It is Christ’s humanity, inasmuch as it is not terminated by its own created personality, and so it can be terminated and possessed by the Word.

Eighth Article: Whether Union Is The Same As Assumption

First conclusion. There is a distinction between union as implying a relation, and assumption that implies an action; for this relation is in Christ’s humanity and follows the active assumption, which is the foundation for this relation, just as passive generation is the foundation of the relation of filiation.

Second conclusion. Hence assumption implies becoming, whereas union implies having become. Thus we say of what took place, that the Word assumed the human nature, and even now that it is united with the Word.

Third conclusion. Whereas union implies a relation of quasi-equivalence, and both the divine nature and the human nature are declared united; but assumption, which is the action of the one assuming, does not designate the divine nature, but the agent assuming and the human nature that is assumed.

Fourth conclusion. Who unites and who assumes are not the same absolutely, for only the Son of God assumed the human nature, but the Father and the Holy Spirit are said to unite, but not to assume. For union as an action implies only the conjunction of extremes, whereas assumption as an action means the same as the taking to oneself, inasmuch as He who assumes unites to Himself personally, and is the end of the terminating action and not merely its beginning. Every external action of God is common to the three persons, just as omnipotence is, from which action derives its power; but one person, such as the person of the Word, can be separately the terminus of some real relation.[613]

Ninth Article: Whether The Union Of The Two Natures In Christ Is The Greatest Of Unions

State of the question. St. Thomas, as Cajetan remarks, considers union here not so much as a relation, but as it is a substantial and immediate conjunction of the two natures in the person of the Word. And the conjunction is the foundation of the above-mentioned relation. There are difficulties, as stated in the beginning of this article.

1. Unity that is the principle of number, seems to be a greater unity than Christ.

2. It seems that this union is not the greatest, because the divine and human natures are infinitely apart, and the greater the distance between the extremes that are united, the less is the union.

3. It seems that the union between body and soul is greater, because from it there results what is one not only in person, but also in nature.

The counterargument presents a contrary objection, as if the union of the Incarnation were greater than the unity of the divine essence.

Reply. The hypostatic union is the greatest of unions, not on the part of the things united, but on the part of the person in whom they are united.

First part. It is proved in the body of this article, and in the reply to the second objection as follows: The greater the distance between the extremes united, the less is the union in this respect. But the divine and human natures, which are the extremes of this union, are infinitely apart. Therefore the union of the divine and the human natures is the least in this respect.

Second part. It is proved as follows: On the part of the medium in which the extremes are united, so much the greater is the union as this medium is in more one and simple, and more intimately united with the extremes. But the medium in this union, namely, the person of the Word, is most simple in Himself, and really identical with the divine nature, and substantially united with the human nature, so that the person of the Word imparts to the human nature both subsistence and existence.[614] Therefore this union, on the part of the medium in which it took place, is the greatest of created unions.

This same principle serves as the means of illustrating the mystical body of Christ. Although the members of His mystical body live far apart from one another in most distant climes, yet they are most closely united both in Christ and in the Holy Spirit.

Thus it is that sometimes two saintly persons living far apart according to their nationality, are more intimately united in Christ than with their fellow citizens. The principle on which the unity of the mystical body of Christ depends is, indeed, far more productive of this spirit of unity than that of any family or nation on this earth.

It is the formal unitive principle that is of greater consideration in union than the actual distance, however great this may be, which separates the members. Thus it is apparent that the greatest intimacy is to be found in the hypostatic union, which evidently far transcends the unity of the mystical body of Christ. Nevertheless the hypostatic union is not so great as the unity of the Trinity;[615] for the unity of the Trinity is a unity of an absolutely simple nature, which is numerically one in the three divine persons and identical with each of them.

St. Bernard has given us three conclusions in equivalent words in one of his works, saying: “Among all things that are properly called one, the unity of the Trinity holds the first place, in which the three persons are one in substance or nature; conversely, that union holds the second place by which three substances are present in the one person of Christ,“[616] namely, the Deity, the soul, and the body.

Reply to first objection. The unity of the divine person in Christ is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number; for the unity of a divine person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, and is incompatible with the nature of a part.

This union is sublime; for what is extraordinary in the order of the beautiful is sublime. Beauty is splendor of unity in variety, and the more distant are the extremes that are united and the more intimately they are united, the more beautiful is their union. This union of which we are speaking is unique, and is both a miracle and an essentially supernatural mystery. Its real possibility is not apodictically proved by reason alone, but it is persuaded and defended against those denying it.

There remains, however, the principal difficulty.[617] It may be expressed by the following syllogism.

That union is greater from which results not only one person, but also one nature. But such is the union between soul and body. Therefore it is greater than the hypostatic union.

Reply to third objection. On the part of the medium in which it takes place, the hypostatic union is nobler, for “the unity of the divine person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us.”[618] This is evident, for the divine person of the Word is absolutely simple, whereas the human person and the human nature are composite. Thus the human composite is corruptible, whereas the hypostatic union is incorruptible.

How shall we reply, therefore, to the major of this objection, namely, that union is greater from which results not only one person but also one nature? I distinguish: that the union is greater on the part of the extremes, this I concede; on the part of the medium, this I deny.

Thus the union in the Incarnation is intensively more perfect than the union between soul and body, and therefore is indissoluble; whereas soul and body are separated by death, and as long as the soul is separated it is not properly a person.

This article is most sublime in doctrine. It can be developed so as to elevate the mind to spiritual things, combining this article with the above-mentioned principle, namely, “It is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself.”[619] This principle is very rich in possibilities if closely examined, first as found in Christ, and then as it applies in a certain extended sense to us in the operational order. Thus it is better for us to be passive in our relations with God, by a perfect conformity of our will with the divine will, than following our own will to rule the world, which is contrary to Satan’s doctrine, who, in seeking to tempt Christ, said: “All these things will I give Thee, if falling down Thou wilt adore me.”[620] Thereupon Jesus says to him: “Begone, Satan! For it is written: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve.”[621] It is a greater dignity for one to exist in someone nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself, and to act in conformity with God’s will than to perform great acts by one’s own choice. As Cajetan says: “It is better to obey the king, than to rule over one’s household,“[622] or it is better to be in a passive frame of mind as regards those superior to us, than to assume an active role as regards those inferior to us; and although it is better to give than to receive, it is better to receive from someone superior to us, than to give to someone inferior to us. Thus the true way of passivity in the spiritual life is nobler than to act, relying on one’s own ability, as Dionysius says of Hierotheus that he was “passive to the divine operations (patiens divina) “[623]

Tenth Article: Whether The Union Of The Two Natures In Christ Took Place By Grace

State of the question. The difficulties at the beginning of this article show clearly the purpose of this question. It seems that the union did not take place by grace, because grace is an accident inhering in the soul of everyone in the state of grace; whereas the hypostatic union is substantial, as stated above, and belongs exclusively to Christ.

Reply. This union did not take place by created grace, which is an accident, and an habitual gift inhering in the soul, but it took place by uncreated grace, which is the gratuitous will of God doing something without any preceding merits on the part of the beneficiary of the gift.

First part. It is evident, because this union is substantial, and not accidental.

Second part. It is also evident, because this union infinitely transcends the faculty and exigencies of created nature, even the angelic.[624]

In this article St. Thomas does not speak of a substantial mode that would be present between the Word that assumes and the humanity that is assumed.

Eleventh Article: Whether Any Merits Preceded The Union Of The Incarnation

State of the question. In a certain sense it seems the Incarnation was merited, for the just of the Old Testament merited eternal life, to which they could attain only through the Incarnation. Therefore it seems that they likewise merited the Incarnation. Also the Church chants of the Blessed Virgin that “she merited to bear the Lord of all “[625]

On the contrary, St. Augustine teaches that no merits preceded our regeneration,[626] and he gives St. Paul as his authority.[627] Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ. Moreover, in the above-mentioned work, St. Augustine shows in his own beautiful way that the predestination of Christ as man to divine natural sonship, could not have been because of Christ’s foreseen merits, for these merits presuppose His person already constituted. From this St. Augustine concludes that likewise our predestination, of which Christ’s predestination is the exemplar, is not because of our foreseen merits, which are the effects of our predestination, as explained by St. Thomas.[628]

Reply. There are three conclusions in the body of the article.

First conclusion. Christ could not merit His incarnation, because every operation of Christ followed the hypostatic union; for Christ was not first a mere man, and afterward united to the Word, but at the very moment His human nature was created, it was personally united to the Word. This conclusion is de fide against Photinus.[629]

Second conclusion. The patriarchs of the Old Testament and the Blessed Virgin Mary did not merit and could not merit de condigno the Incarnation, and this for three reasons.

1. Because the Incarnation transcends the beatitude of eternal life, to which the merits of the just are ordained as their ultimate reward. The Incarnation establishes the hypostatic order above the order of grace and glory.

2. Because the principle of grace cannot fall under merit, for it would be its own cause. Thus the state of grace does not fall under merit, and a fortiori this applies to the Incarnation, which is the principle of grace, for the Gospel says: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.”[630]

3. Because the incarnation of Christ is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it is not on account of the merit of any particular man. St. John says: “Of His fullness we have all received.”[631]

Third conclusion. Yet the patriarchs of the Old Testament merited the Incarnation congruously or in a broad sense by desiring and beseeching, for it was becoming that God should hearken to those who obeyed Him. “The Blessed Virgin,” says St. Thomas, “is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness which fitted her to be the Mother of God.”[632] These are golden words, and in the strictest sense express what the Blessed Virgin Mary truly merited, for she did not merit the Incarnation, which is the principle of that plenitude of grace which she received so as to merit, but she merited an increase of grace by which she became worthy to be the Mother of God.[633]

There are some doubts that arise concerning this article.

For the solution of these doubts we must recall the division of merit as set forth in the treatise on grace. Merit is a work performed that is deserving of a reward, or, more correctly, there is a right to a reward in this work performed. Hence the foundation for this division is according to the excellence of the work performed, inasmuch as there is or is not equality of proportion between the work performed and the reward. There is this proportion in condign merit, but not in congruous merit.

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